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RECENT
DEVELOPMENT
Disclosure and Civil Use of Immunized
Testimony
I. INTRODUCTION
During the grand jury stage1 of a criminal prosecution, the
federal government2 often will compel the testimony of a witness
despite the witness' fifth amendment claim of privilege against
self-incrimination, by granting him use immunity pursuant to the
federal statute.4 The statute provides that once the witness re-
ceives a grant of immunity, compelled testimony or information
derived directly or indirectly therefrom cannot be used against him
in a criminal proceeding.5 If criminal prosecution of the witness
ensues, the government6 must bear the affirmative burden of prov-
ing that its evidence derives from a source independent of the im-
munized testimony.7 The government often grants use immunity to
a witness who is not the immediate target of criminal prosecution
but whose testimony constitutes valuable evidence against a crimi-
1. This study focuses on the problems posed by the disclosure and civil use of immu-
nized grand jury testimony, as opposed to trial testimony. This study does not discuss per-
missible uses of immunized testimony in the criminal context. For discussion of those uses,
see United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115 (1980); Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100
(1979); New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979); Hoffman, The Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination and Immunity Statutes: Permissible Uses of Immunized Testimony, 16
CraIm. L. BULL. 421 (1980).
2. A United States attorney acts for the federal government in initiating a grant of use
immunity. See 18 U.S.C. § 6003 (1976).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides, "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself...."
4. 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1976) contain all provisions of the federal immunity
statute.
5. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1976). Protection does not extend to perjured, immunized testi-
mony or to cases in which the witness fails to comply with the order granting immunity. Id.
6. Both federal and state prosecutors may proceed against an immunized witness as
long as the evidence does not derive from the immunized source. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 24-27.




Immunization 9 only protects a witness from the use of his tes-
timony in criminal, not civil contexts.'0 Since certain criminal acts
subject the perpetrator to concurrent civil liabilities,1' an immu-
nized witness often will be asked to repeat his testimony for pur-
poses of subsequent related civil litigation. Moreover, if a plaintiff
sues the defendant in a criminal prosecution on a related civil mat-
ter, the plaintiff may seek to depose or obtain the immunized testi-
mony of the nontarget witness if the testimony constitutes valua-
ble evidence of the defendant's civil liability.
Courts hold that a witness who voluntarily repeats his immu-
nized testimony in a separate proceeding waives his privilege
against self-incrimination. The repeated testimony of the witness
then constitutes an independent source of information that a pros-
ecutor may use against the witness in a subsequent criminal pro-
ceeding without fear of taint. 2 An immunized witness seeking to
preserve the fifth amendment protection is thus well advised to de-
cline to repeat voluntarily the substance of his immunized state-
ments. Only official coercion in the form of a second grant of im-
munity assures the witness that his repeated statements will
remain a protected source of evidence that cannot be used against
him in a criminal proceeding. If a civil plaintiff who is trying to
obtain the immunized testimony of the witness is a private party,
8. 1 Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE, & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 715 (5th ed.
1980) [hereinafter cited as KAMISAR].
9. Immunization in this context refers to both "use" and "transactional" immunity.
Transactional immunity protects a witness from prosecution for any transaction about
which he testifies or produces evidence. See infra notes 19-34 and accompanying text.
10. See Patrick v. United States, 524 F.2d 1109, 1118-19 (7th Cir. 1975); United States
v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1359 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Kates, 419 F. Supp. 846,
857-58 (E.D. Pa. 1976). This limited protection makes sense since a witness cannot invoke a
fifth amendment privilege on the grounds that his testimony might subject him to civil
liability.
11. Concurrent civil liability for criminal acts arises in crimes such as income tax eva-
sion or price fixing. See Patrick v. United States, 524 F.2d 1109 (7th Cir. 1975); KAMISAR,
supra note 8, at 745.
12. United States v. Kuehn, 562 F.2d 427, 430 (7th Cir. 1977). Kuehn held that the
immunized witness who voluntarily repeats his testimony cannot use prior immunization to
protect the subsequent revelation. In effect, the Kuehn decision puts the immunized witness
on an equal footing with the witness who offers self-incriminating testimony without the
benefit of immunization. Regardless of the conditions surrounding the original testimony,
any witness who is asked to repeat his statements either must invoke the fifth amendment
privilege or waive it. A prior grant of immunity does not bar the possibility of a subsequent
waiver any more than a prior waiver bars invocation of the fifth amendment privilege at a
later proceeding. See generally Comment, Requiring Witnesses to Repeat Themselves, 47
TEx. L. REV. 266 (1969).
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he has no power to confer a second grant of immunity upon the
witness. Further, the presiding court cannot initiate an immunity
grant since the statute expressly reserves that right for the federal
prosecutor.13 Therefore, unless the court determines that other cir-
cumstances exist which eliminate the possibility that the witness
will subject himself to criminal prosecution by repeating his testi-
mony,1 4 the witness may invoke his privilege against self-incrimi-
nation and refuse to be deposed or to testify.1 5 In those instances
in which the witness' invocation of the privilege effectively blocks
all means of valuable discovery in civil litigation, the plaintiff may
seek a release of the witness' grand jury testimony. Although the
effectiveness of the grand jury proceeding as an investigative tool
depends largely upon its secrecy, courts do have the authority to
disclose grand jury material for use in a judicial action if the re-
questing parties demonstrate a particularized need for the materi-
als that outweighs the secrecy interest. 16
13. 18 U.S.C. § 6003 (1976). The federal government's immunity granting power con-
stitutes a valuable discovery device. In many instances a prosecutor may have a choice
whether to proceed against a defendant civilly or criminally. In United States v. Cappetto,
502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), the prosecutor pursued a civil remedy against a defendant
charged with a gambling offense and sought a court order granting the defendant use immu-
nity in order to expedite civil discovery. Id. at 1354-55. This device is unavailable to private
litigants because they have no authority to grant immunity.
14. See, e.g., In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 465 F. Supp. 618 (N.D. Ill.), rev'd,
609 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1979). In Folding Carton the district court ruled that the immunized
witness had no fifth amendment claim to invoke in a civil trial because the prospect of
future prosecution was unlikely. The court of appeals reversed on grounds that the applica-
ble standard was whether more than a "fanciful" possibility of prosecution existed. Id.
15. In Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951), the Supreme Court established
general guidelines for courts to use in assessing the validity of a witness' claim of a fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The Court stated,
The privilege afforded not only extends to answers that would in themselves sup-
port a conviction under a . . . criminal statute but likewise embraces those which
would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant for a
• . . crime.... But this protection must be confined to instances where the witness
has reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer.. . . The witness is not
exonerated from answering merely because he declares that in so doing he would in-
criminate himself-his say-so does not of itself establish the hazard of incrimination. It
is for the court to say whether his silence is justified. . . and to require him to answer
if "it clearly appears to the court that he is mistaken.". . . However, if the witness. ..
were required to prove the hazard in the sense in which a claim is usually required to
be established in court, he would be compelled to surrender the very protection which
the privilege is designed to guarantee. To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident
from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a respon-
sive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be
dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.
Id. at 486-87 (citations omitted).
16. FED. R. CRiM. P. 6(e).
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Judicial release of nonimmunized grand jury testimony for use
in a civil context does not invalidate a recalcitrant witness' valid
fifth amendment claim because disclosure by itself does not re-
move the risk of future criminal prosecution. Recent federal deci-
sions, however, suggest that when courts have granted civil plain-
tiffs access to immunized grand jury testimony and the plaintiff
intends to base all questioning of the witness on the immunized
testimony, the witness' claim of privilege may be nullified.17 The
Second and Eighth Circuits have held that the use of immunized
testimony as a source of questioning abrogates the privilege be-
cause it taints the witness' responses to the extent that no prosecu-
tor could use the testimony in a subsequent criminal proceeding
against the witness. Because the witness no longer runs the risk of
self-incrimination, he may not assert the privilege and instead
must testify. The Fifth and Seventh Circuits, in contrast, have
held that prospectively determining the taint of a witness' testi-
mony is improper in the evaluation of a claim of fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination and results in a de facto grant
of immunity that exceeds the scope of judicial authority.
This Recent Development examines the current conflict
among the circuits. This study first explores the rationales under-
lying use immunity and contrasts them with the guidelines formu-
lated by the Supreme Court for controlling judicial disclosure of
grand jury testimony. Second, this Recent Development examines
the analyses used by the federal courts in determining whether to
release immunized grand jury testimony for civil use's and the ef-
fect of disclosure on a witness' claim of fifth amendment privilege.
This study submits that in their effort to promote civil discovery,
several courts have misconstrued the scope and effect of the disclo-
sure power and have usurped the prosecutor's exclusive right
under the federal statute to grant immunity. This Recent Develop-
17. See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., Appeal of Fleischacker, 644 F.2d
70 (2d Cir. 1981); In re Starkey, 600 F.2d 1043 (8th Cir. 1979). But see In re Corrugated
Container Antitrust Litig., Appeal of Conboy, 661 F.2d 1145, rev'g 655 F.2d 748 (7th Cir.
1981), cert. granted sub nom. Pillsbury v. Conhoy, 102 S. Ct. 998 (1982); In re Corrugated
Container Antitrust Litig., Appeal of Franey, 620 F.2d 1086 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1102 (1981). This study also examines the Eighth Circuit's recent holding in Little
Rock School Dist. v. Borden, Inc., 632 F.2d 700 (8th Cir. 1980), in which no disclosure oc-
curred but the court nevertheless made a prospective taint determination and overruled
witnesses' otherwise valid fifth amendment objections.
18. This study focuses on disclosure decisions made in In re Starkey, 600 F.2d 1043,
1045 (8th Cir. 1979); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
63,192 (S.D. Tex. 1980); Little Rock School Dist. v. Borden, Inc., 1979-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
1 62,809 (E.D. Ark. 1979).
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ment suggests alternative guidelines that courts might use in de-
termining whether to release immunized grand jury testimony and
the effect that disclosure should have on a court's evaluation of a
witness' fifth amendment claim. The study concludes that courts
should not allow disclosure and private litigants' use of immunized
testimony to override a witness' otherwise valid assertion of the
right against self-incrimination.
II. IMMUNITY AND DISCLOSURE
A. Use Immunity and the Coextensiveness Requirement
In 1892 the Supreme Court in Counselman v. Hitchcock19 ar-
ticulated a standard for measuring the constitutionality of a fed-
eral immunity statute. The Court declared that "legislation cannot
abridge a constitutional privilege, and . . . it cannot replace or
supply one, at least unless it is so broad as to have the same extent
in scope and effect."'20 The Counselman decision indicated that
only a statute granting a recalcitrant witness absolute protection
from future prosecution for crimes about which the government
compelled him to testify would be fully coextensive with the fifth
amendment privilege.2 1 Conferral of this absolute "transactional" 22
immunity required the federal government to forfeit its right to
prosecute the witness even when the government could prove that
it obtained its evidence against the witness from a source indepen-
dent of the compelled testimony. 3
The Supreme Court's recognition in 1964 that the fifth
19. 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
20. Id. at 585.
21. Justice Blatchford, speaking for the Court, said, "We are clearly of [the] opinion
that no statute which leaves the party or witness subject to prosecution after he answers the
criminating question put to him, can have the effect of supplanting the privilege conferred
by the Constitution of the United States." Id. at 585.
22. Transactional immunity is the term usually applied to statutory protection afford-
ing the witness freedom from prosecution "for or on account of any transaction, matter or
thing, concerning which he may testify, or produce evidence. .. ." See Brown v. Walker,
161 U.S. 591, 594 (1896) (upholding constitutionality of federal immunity statute affording
transactional protection); KAMISAR, supra note 8, at 763.
23. Limits exist to the protections granted under transactional immunity. First, trans-
actional immunity does not protect a witness from a perjury prosecution based on his im-
munized remarks. Second, transactional protection extends only to the offenses about which
the grantee is questioned. Thus, immunization does not protect unresponsive answers which
reveal incriminating evidence not sought originally by the questioner. KAMISAR, supra note
8, at 763. Both these limitations apply to use immunity as well as to transactional immunity.
See 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1976); Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S.
472 (1972) (New Jersey use immunity statute imposing responsiveness requirement upheld).
1982] 1215
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amendment applied to the states2 4 necessitated a determination of
the protections that state and federal grants of immunity afforded
a witness. In Murphy v. Waterfront Commission25 the Court de-
clared that the fifth amendment privilege (and thus a coextensive
grant of immunity) would protect a federal witness against incrimi-
nation under state as well as federal law and, correspondingly,
would protect a state witness against incrimination under both
federal and state law.2 6 The Court's characterization of the scope
of interjurisdictional protection, however, was not of the absolute
transactional nature envisioned by the Counselman Court. In Mur-
phy the Court held that a prosecutor from one jurisdiction could
not use testimony or the "fruits" of testimony immunized by an-
other jurisdiction against the witness in a criminal prosecution.
The Court, however, did not specifically forbid subsequent prose-
cution of the witness.2 7 By characterizing this interjurisdictional
protection as coextensive with the fifth amendment privilege, the
Murphy decision implied that a statute conferring something less
than absolute "transactional" immunity nevertheless could qualify
as constitutional. In Kastigar v. United States5 the Court con-
firmed the implication explicitly.
Kastigar concerned the immunity provisions that were part of
the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.2' These provisions,
24. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
25. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
26. Id. at 77-78.
27. Id. at 79-80.
28. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
29. 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-6003 (1976). Section 6002 provides:
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, to
testify or provide other information in a proceeding before or ancillary to-
(1) a court or grand jury of the United States,
(2) an agency of the United States, or
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a committee or
a subcommittee of either House,
and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness an order
issued under this part, the witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the
basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but no testimony or other information
compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such
testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case,
except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to com-
ply with the order.
Section 6003 provides:
(a) In the case of any individual who has been or may be called to testify or pro-
vide other information at any proceeding before or ancillary to a court of the United
States or a grand jury of the United States, the United States district court for the
judicial district in which the proceeding is or may be held shall issue, in accordance
1216
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which currently apply, protect an immunized witness by providing
that the government may use neither the compelled testimony nor
information derived directly or indirectly therefrom against the
witness in any criminal case. The government, however, still may
prosecute the witness if it meets the "affirmative" duty of proving
that the evidence it intends to use derives from a "legitimate
source wholly independent of the compelled testimony. '30 Petition-
ers in Kastigar challenged the constitutionality of statutory use
immunity, asserting that because it offered less than absolute pro-
tection from future prosecution, use immunity was not coextensive
with the privilege against self-incrimination and thus could not
supplant it.31 The Court rejected petitioners' claim, declaring that
since a witness' invocation of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion does not bar subsequent prosecution, transactional immunity
actually offers a broader protection than does the fifth amend-
ment.3 2 Quoting Murphy, the Court stated that statutory use im-
munity "'leaves the witness and the Federal Government in sub-
stantially the same position as if the witness had claimed his
privilege.' ,s The Court supported its conclusion with an analogy
to the fifth amendment protection against coerced confessions,
noting that while these confessions are inadmissible in a criminal
trial, their existence does not negate the government's right to
prosecute.'
B. Governmental Rights and Limitations
One could construe the Supreme Court's ruling in Kastigar,
which constitutionally validated statutory use immunity, as a sig-
with subsection (b) of this section, upon the request of the United States attorney for
such district, an order requiring such individual to give testimony or provide other
information which he refuses to give or provide on the basis of his privilege against
self-incrimination, such order to become effective as provided in section 6002 of this
part.
(b) A United States attorney may, with the approval of the Attorney General, the
Deputy Attorney General, or any designated Assistant Attorney General, request an
order under subsection (a) of this section when in his judgment-
(1) the testimony or other information from such individual may be necessary to
the public interest; and
(2) such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide other
information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination.
30. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460 (1972).
31. Id. at 448-51.
32. Id. at 453.
33. Id. at 458-59 (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964)).
34. 406 U.S. at 461.
1982] 1217
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nificant victory for prosecutors. The Court's decision explicitly
condones the process by which a prosecutor uses his immunity-
granting power to compel needed testimony and at the same time
maintains the government's right to prosecute the witness subse-
quently. This executive power, however, is subject to inherent limi-
tations.3 5 One limitation is the practical problem of preserving a
case against an immunized witness when the witness testifies
against another criminal target. As the witness reveals more infor-
mation during his testimony, the burden on the government in-
creases to show that the evidence it uses against the witness in a
subsequent proceeding derives from a source independent of the
witness' immunized statements. The prosecutor must edit his
questions to elicit only the needed information without allowing
the witness to incriminate himself beyond the point at which the
government's criminal case against him will fail for lack of prov-
ably untainted evidence. Recognizing that witnesses intentionally
will reveal information not sought by the prosecution in order to
broaden their immunized status, the Supreme Court has held con-
stitutional a use immunity statute that protects only those answers
that are "responsive" to the questions posed by the prosecutor.3 6
A second limitation on the government's control of immunized
materials stems from a court's power under Rule 6(e) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure to permit disclosure of immu-
nized testimony for use in a civil proceeding. Under certain cir-
cumstances, if a witness voluntarily repeats his immunized
testimony, a prosecutor can use that testimony against the witness
in a criminal proceeding, having satisfied the Kastigar indepen-
dent source requirement.3 7 In United States v. Kuehn 8 the Sev-
enth Circuit held that a federally immunized witness who volunta-
rily repeated his grand jury testimony 9 to a reporter created an
independent source of incriminating evidence that the prosecution
35. For a detailed analysis of the prosecutorial problems posed by use immunity, see
Strachan, Self-Incrimination, Immunity, and Watergate, 56 TEx. L. REv. 791 (1978) [here-
inafter cited as Strachan].
36. See Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472 (1972)
(New Jersey use immunity statute). The New Jersey Supreme Court explained that the
purpose of the statutory responsiveness requirement was "'to prevent a witness from seek-
ing undue protection by volunteering what the state already knows or will likely come upon
without the witness' aid. Fairly construed, the Statute protects the witness against answers
and evidence he in good faith believed were demanded.'" Id. at 476 (quoting Zicarelli v.
New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 55 N.J. 249, 270-71, 261 A.2d 129, 140 (1970)).
37. See supra note 12.
38. 562 F.2d 427 (7th Cir. 1977).
39. In his testimony the witness admitted to bribing a judge. Id. at 430-32.
[Vol. 35:1211
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could use against him in a subsequent criminal case without in-
fringing upon the witness' federal use immunity protections.40
Kuehn suggests that a witness who is asked to repeat his testimony
for use in a civil case should refuse to do so on grounds of self-
incrimination. Otherwise the government could use his voluntary
remarks later as an independent source of evidence against him in
a criminal trial. To avoid losing valuable evidence, the civil litigant
probably will move for disclosure of the recalcitrant witness' im-
munized testimony. The interests of the civil litigant may conflict
with those of the prosecutor who has gathered additional evidence
against the witness for use in a future criminal proceeding, since
disclosure of the immunized testimony likely will increase the gov-
ernment's burden of proving that its new evidence is untainted. 1
Although the federal prosecutor rather than the court has the au-
thority pursuant to the statute to initiate a grant of immunity to a
grand jury witness, 42 a court subsequently may release the immu-
nized testimony for use in a judicial proceeding. As a result, while
the prosecutor has standing in federal court to object to a civil liti-
gant's motion for the release of grand jury materials, 3 Rule 6(e) of
40. Id.
41. See Strachan, supra note 35, at 822.
42. See supra note 29. The statute permits a court to compel a witness' testimony only
upon request of the federal prosecutor when he discerns that the testimony is necessary to
the public interest and that the witness has or will refuse to testify on the basis of his
privilege against self-incrimination.
As interpreted by the federal courts, the judicial role in the immunization process is
solely ministerial, consisting of ascertaining whether the government's request complies with
the procedural and jurisdictional requirements set forth in the statute. As the Seventh Cir-
cuit stated:
[T]he decision whether to confer immunity in order to facilitate the government's in-
vestigation is the product of the balancing of the public need for the particular testi-
mony . . . against the social cost of granting immunity and thereby precluding the
possibility of criminally prosecuting an individual who has violated the criminal law.
Therefore, the relative importance of particular testimony to federal law enforcement
interests is a judgmental rather than a legal determination, one remaining wholly
within the competence of appropriate executive officials. . . . Under no circumstances
. . . may a federal court prescribe immunity on its own initiative, or determine whether
application for an immunity order. . . is necessary, advisable, or reflective of the pub-
lic interest, for the federal judiciary may not arrogate a prerogative specifically with-
held by Congress.
In re Daley, 549 F.2d 469, 478-79 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
43. See State v. Sarbaugh, 552 F.2d 768, 777 n.14 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. J.S.
Simmons Co. v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 889 (1977); United States v. Armco Steel Corp., 458 F.
Supp. 784, 788 (W.D. Mo. 1978) ("[T]he proper procedure... is to commence an indepen-
dent civil action for disclosure of grand jury materials pursuant to Rule 6(e) . . . . The
government should be made a party so that it may express its views and the criminal defen-
dants should be served and permitted to intervene").
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the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure44 delegates to the courts
the ultimate decisionmaking power regarding disclosure. This judi-
cial power constitutes a significant check on the prosecutor's con-
trol of immunized materials and subsequent ability to prosecute.
The Supreme Court's decision in Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol
Stops Northwest45 illustrates both the breadth and the limits of
judicial discretion permitted in the disclosure decision. In Douglas
the Supreme Court addressed two issues regarding the release of
immunized testimony pursuant to rule 6(e). First, the Court set
forth judicial guidelines for determining whether disclosure should
be made. Noting that public policy favors secrecy in grand jury
matters, the Court stated:
[I]f preindictment proceedings were made public, many prospective wit-
nesses would be hesitant to come forward voluntarily, knowing that those
against whom they testify would be aware of that testimony. Moreover, wit-
44. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) provides in part:
(1) Recording of proceedings. -All proceedings, except when the grand jury is deliber-
ating or voting, shall be recorded stenographically or by an electronic recording
device....
(2) General Rule of Secrecy. -A grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an opera-
tor of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for
the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph 3(A) (ii) of
this subdivision shall not disclose matters occurring before the grand jury except as
otherwise provided in these rules ...
(3) Exceptions
(A) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before the grand
jury, other than its deliberations and the vote of any grand juror, may be made to -
(i) an attorney for the government for use in the performance of such attor-
ney's duty; and
(ii) such government personnel as are deemed necessary by an attorney for the
government to assist an attorney for the government in the performance of
such attorney's duty to enforce federal criminal law.
(B) Any person to whom matters are disclosed under subparagraph (A) (ii) of this
paragraph shall not utilize that grand jury material for any purpose other than assist-
ing the attorney for the government in the performance of such attorney's duty to
enforce federal criminal law. An attorney for the government shall promptly provide
the district court, before which was impaneled the grand jury whose material has
been so disclosed, with the names of the persons to whom such disclosure has been
made.
(C) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before the grand
jury may also be made -
(i) when so directed by a court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial
proceeding; or
(ii) when permitted by a court at the request of the defendant, upon a showing
that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of mat-
ters occurring before the grand jury.
If the court orders disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury, the disclosure shall
be made in such manner, at such time, and under such conditions as the court may direct.
45. 441 U.S. 211 (1979).
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nesses who appeared before the grand jury would be less likely to testify fully
and frankly, as they would be open to retribution as well as to inducements.
There would also be the risk that those about to be indicted would flee, or
would try to influence individual grand jurors to vote against indictment. Fi-
nally, by preserving the secrecy of the proceedings, we assure that persons
who are accused but exonerated by the grand jury will not be held up to
public ridicule. 6
The Court outlined the requirements that a civil litigant must
meet in requesting the release of grand jury testimony. The Court
ruled that first the litigant must limit the request to the specific
material needed for the civil suit. Second, the civil litigant must
show that without disclosure, injustice might ensue in the civil pro-
ceeding. Last, the litigant must show that the "particularized
need" for disclosure outweighs the need for secrecy.4 7 In a footnote
the Court cited situations in which a litigant intends to use a grand
jury transcript at trial to impeach the witness, to refresh the wit-
ness' recollection, or to test the witness' credibility as examples of
particularized needs that could outweigh the secrecy interest and
thus justify judicial release of the transcripts.48 The Court noted
that as the need for secrecy declines, the burden on the litigant to
justify release also diminishes.4 ' Furthermore, the Court declared
that a judge, in exercising the "substantial discretion" 50 required
to make the decision whether to disclose, should consider not only
the effect the disclosure will have on the particular case, but also
the potential effect the decision will have upon the future func-
tioning of grand juries. 51
The second issue the Douglas Court addressed was whether
the district court in charge of the civil litigation or the district
court that held the grand jury materials in custody should rule on
a civil litigant's motion for disclosure. The Douglas Court held that
as a general rule the court that supervised the grand jury proceed-
ings should determine disclosure since that court would be better
qualified to evaluate the need for secrecy.52 The Douglas opinion
suggested, however, that courts should modify the rule when a liti-
gant requests disclosure of grand jury material for use in a civil
46. Id. at 219. The Court in this quotation paraphrased its earlier holding in United
States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958). See 441 U.S. at 219 n.10.
47. 441 U.S. at 222.
48. Id. at 222 n.12. Again, the Court referred to its earlier holding in United States v.
Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958).
49. 441 U.S. at 223.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 222.
52. Id. at 224-26.
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case that will be tried in a different district since the court that
had custody of the transcripts would not have access to first hand
information by which to evaluate the need for the transcripts in
the pending litigation.5 3 Douglas proposed that, in this instance,
the court with custody should make only an initial determination,
based on the limited information available, whether disclosure
might be appropriate in light of the need for secrecy.54 If the cir-
cumstances might warrant disclosure, the Douglas Court suggested
that the grand jury materials should be sent to the court con-
ducting the civil litigation. The litigation court, having specific
knowledge of the issues in the civil suit, would be able to balance
the litigant's need for disclosure against the custody court's evalua-
tion of the need for continued secrecy of grand jury materials and
reach a final decision.55 The Douglas decision does not address the
particular problems associated with the release of immunized as
opposed to nonimmunized grand jury testimony. Moreover, by del-
egating responsibility for the final disclosure decision to the court
in charge of civil litigation, the Douglas decision creates a danger-
ous situation in which a single decisionmaker may both disclose
immunized materials and evaluate the effect of this disclosure on a
recalcitrant civil witness' claim of fifth amendment privilege.
The interplay among the Kastigar, Douglas, and Kuehn deci-
sions predictably has fostered much confusion. While Kastigar
warns the government against prosecuting an immunized witness
with evidence derived from the witness' immunized testimony,
Kuehn suggests that later voluntary repetition by the witness of
his immunized remarks may dissipate any taint and thereby per-
mit the government to use the repeated statements against the
witness in a criminal proceeding. When a plaintiff sues a criminally
prosecuted defendant on a related civil matter, the Kuehn holding
operates to block meaningful discovery since a witness who testi-
fied against the defendant under a grant of immunity will want to
preserve his right to refuse to repeat voluntarily his statements for
civil use. Although Douglas allows a court to release a witness' im-
munized testimony upon a civil plaintiff's request, if the material
is grand jury testimony it has not been subject to cross-examina-
tion, which hinders its introduction as substantive evidence. Typi-
cally, the civil plaintiff will attempt to depose the recalcitrant wit-
53. Id. at 226.
54. Id. at 230.
55. Id. at 230-31.
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ness, using the released immunized materials as a source of
questions. The plaintiff argues that under Kastigar the witness' re-
sponses will derive from an immunized source and hence will be
inadmissible in a subsequent criminal proceeding against the wit-
ness. The witness, citing Kuehn, argues that if his responses are
voluntary rather than coerced, his testimony will constitute a new,
independent source of evidence that may be used against him in a
criminal trial. The federal courts, seeking to resolve the dilemma,
instead have clouded the issues, as the next part of this Recent
Development shows.
III. THE FEDERAL DECISIONS
A. Disclosure and Compulsion: The Eighth Circuit Holdings
In re Starkey5" was one of the first cases to suggest that judi-
cial disclosure of grand jury transcripts could extend immunity to
a recalcitrant witness in the civil context and thus abrogate his
right to invoke the fifth amendment privilege.5 7 In a federal grand
jury investigation of antitrust violations in Arkansas' dairy indus-
try, Starkey, an employee of one of the targeted defendants, testi-
fied under a grant of statutory use immunity.58 All defendants
56. 600 F.2d 1043 (8th Cir. 1979).
57. See also United States v. Borden, Inc., 1976-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 61,177 (D. Ariz.
1976). In Borden the federal government immunized 14 grand jury witnesses who then testi-
fied against corporate and individual violators of federal antitrust laws, which govern the
marketing of dairy products in Arizona. After the federal criminal proceeding terminated,
private plaintiffs instituted a cause of action naming the State of Arizona as a party. The
plaintiffs sought to depose the nonparty witnesses but the witnesses refused to repeat their
grand jury testimony voluntarily, asserting their fifth amendment privilege. The private
plaintiffs next tried to persuade the witnesses to testify by seeking waivers of prosecution
from both the state and federal governments. The federal government cooperated but the
state refused. Plaintiffs then moved to compel deposition testimony, but the district court,
no doubt cognizant of Arizona's refusal to grant a waiver of prosecution, denied the motion.
Private plaintiffs then sought release of the grand jury transcripts, arguing that such disclo-
sure "would, in fact, extend the use immunity granted to the grand jury witnesses by the
federal government, affording the witnesses more immunity from prosecution than originally
intended." Id. at 70,341. The district court found that plaintiffs had shown a particularized
need for disclosure and ordered the production of the transcripts. The court's decision did
not elaborate upon the nature and degree of plaintiffs' particularized need, leaving one to
infer that the potential blocking of civil discovery constituted a sufficient reason for disclo-
sure. The court was unclear about how plaintiffs would use the transcripts in their civil suit.
The court did specify that the transcripts could not be used for criminal prosecution of any
witnesses and further charged that only the state attorney in charge of the civil suit could
have access to them. The Borden court never stated explicitly that the release of immunized
testimony would negate a witness' claim of privilege, although plaintiffs' characterization of
disclosure as an extension of use immunity implied it.
58. 600 F.2d at 1045. Starkey was a sales manager for Dean Milk.
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pleaded nolo contendere and either were fined or, in the case of
individual violators, received jail sentences. 9 Subsequently, the
State of Arkansas brought a civil suit against some of the indicted
defendants. Starkey declined to repeat his grand jury statements
at civil deposition on fifth amendment grounds.6 0 The district
court, Judge Eisele presiding, previously had granted Arkansas ac-
cess to Starkey's grand jury testimony"1 and the attorney for Ar-
kansas admitted that he based all deposition questions on that tes-
timony. 2The district court held that it could compel Starkey to
answer despite his claim of privilege. Citing Kastigar, Judge Eisele
stated, "Mr. Starkey's grand jury testimony 'permeates' the depo-
sition questions. Therefore, the deposition testimony. . . would be
. ..'derived' from his grand jury testimony and cannot constitute
an independent source upon which a criminal prosecution should
be based."6" On appeal- the Eighth Circuit stated that Starkey did
not have a right to invoke his fifth amendment privilege at a civil
deposition unless by testifying he would be subjecting himself to
criminal prosecution.64 The court, however, did not find it neces-
sary to assess the probability that the government later would
bring a criminal proceeding against Starkey because the deposition
testimony itself would be immunized. 5 Restating the district
court's reasoning, the Eighth Circuit ruled that since the deposi-
tion questions obviously were dependent upon Starkey's immu-
nized grand jury statements, the deposition testimony would be
"tainted" and would not constitute an independent source of evi-
dence for subsequent prosecution. 6 Although the court recognized
that the federal prosecutor, not a party to the civil suit, could not
confer a second grant of immunity upon the witness, and that the
state had not waived future criminal prosecution, the court deter-
mined nevertheless that Starkey's tainted deposition would protect
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas served as
forum for both the criminal and civil proceedings. Judge Oren Harris presided over the
criminal proceedings while Judge Eisele heard the civil suit and made the initial disclosure
decision. See Little Rock School Dist. v. Borden, Inc., 1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 62,020
(E.D. Ark. 1978).
62. 600 F.2d at 1046.
63. Little Rock School Dist. v. Borden, Inc., 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 62,471, at
76,760 (E.D. Ark. 1979).
64. 600 F.2d at 1045.




him. 7 Starkey argued that by compelling his testimony, the trial
court in effect was granting him immunity and thus usurping the
prosecutor's role. The Eighth Circuit denied Starkey's allegation,
stating that the district court merely had made a proper judicial
finding of what constituted a derived use of immunized testi-
mony. 8 Starkey also argued that under Kuehn, his repeated testi-
mony constituted a voluntary disclosure of immunized statements
and thus could be used against him. The court distinguished
Kuehn on grounds that the witness in Kuehn repeated his testi-
mony voluntarily, whereas Starkey was compelled to repeat his
statements and did so involuntarily.e9 The Eighth Circuit modified
the district court's holding by requiring Starkey to answer only
those questions that fell within the "same time, geographical and
substantive framework as the grand jury testimony. 7 0 Although
the Eighth Circuit did not address the merits of the district court's
disclosure decision, it did note that Judge Eisele released immu-
nized material because a breach of secrecy already had occurred
through inadvertent disclosure of a federal government memoran-
dum containing excerpts of the material, and through release of
Starkey's immunized testimony to his defendant-employer.7 1 In
fact, in Starkey civil plaintiffs requested, and the district court re-
leased the witness' testimony to civil plaintiffs for impeachment/
refreshment purposes before any fifth amendment objection be-
came known.72 Circumstances differed in Little Rock School Dis-
trict v. Borden, Inc.," which addressed the same antitrust matter
as Starkey.
In Little Rock the State of Arkansas, again acting as civil
plaintiff, sought to depose several previously indicted witnesses 4
who had testified under a grant of federal use immunity during a
second grand jury investigation" of price fixing in Arkansas' dairy
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1047-48.
69. Id. at 1048.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1045.
72. Little Rock School Dist. v. Borden, Inc., 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,471 at
76,760 n.1 (E.D. Ark. 1979) (referring to earlier disclosure decision, 1978-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 1 62,020 (E.D. Ark. 1978).
73. 1979-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 62,809 (E.D. Ark. 1979).
74. The witnesses were Simeon W. Lynn and Eugene F. Proctor.
75. Proctor, Lynn, and corporate defendants Borden, Inc., Coleman Dairy, Inc., and
Dean Foods Products Co., pleaded nolo contendere to the first grand jury indictment and
were convicted on December 27, 1977. 1979-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 62,809, at 78,716.
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industry.7 The witnesses refused to respond to deposition ques-
tions, invoking their fifth amendment privilege. Plaintiff sought ju-
dicial disclosure of the witnesses' immunized testimony, asserting
three reasons for a particularized need." First, plaintiff argued
that by asserting their fifth amendment claims, the witnesses had
rendered themselves "unavailable" and thus, under Rule 804(b)(5)
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the grand jury transcripts were
admissible as evidence in the civil suit. Second, plaintiff argued
that by invoking the privilege, the witnesses had blocked all dis-
covery and, therefore, disclosure was necessary to further the civil
suit. Last, the State of Arkansas, relying on Starkey, contended
that disclosure of the immunized materials was a prerequisite to an
order compelling live deposition testimony, since a "de facto ex-
tension of use immunity. . . [occurs] when immunized grand jury
testimony is disclosed for purposes of civil discovery [and] is itself
a sufficient need for disclosure in the first place. '7 8
Judge Eisele found that a secrecy interest did exist with re-
spect to the witnesses' testimony, because no one had prior access
to the grand jury transcripts.79 He weighed plaintiff's three reasons
for disclosure against this secrecy interest. The court reserved for
trial the question of the use of the grand jury transcripts as sub-
stantive evidence. Judge Eisele found that the existence of the
hearsay rule was not sufficient to justify granting access since ad-
missibility alone did not constitute a showing of particularized
need. 0 Judge Eisele responded to plaintiff's assertion that the wit-
nesses were blocking all meaningful discovery by stating that the
court found no evidence that plaintiffs would have to discontinue
the civil case without disclosure.81 Judge Eisele characterized
plaintiff's third argument, that disclosure was necessary to compel
live testimony, as "a fine example of circular reasoning. ' '18 Judge
Eisele distinguished Starkey from the case at bar, noting that he
based the disclosure decision in Starkey on "traditional reasons for
breaching grand jury secrecy" and not on any attempt to compel
deposition testimony. Furthermore, he stated:
A de facto extension of a use immunity before the grand jury, by way of the
76. Id.
77. Id. at 78,716-17.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 78,717.





disclosure of immunized grand jury testimony, may be a consequence of oth-
erwise proper disclosure for impeachment purposes in a civil case, with the
further result that a deponent's fifth amendment objection is overcome, but
the desire for such a de facto extension cannot of itself serve as a legitimate
reason for the breach of the grand jury secrecy in the first place ...
Were the Court to hold [otherwise] then the Court would indeed be en-
gaged in the direct creation of immunity, an improper function. The Court's
position is, rather, that when immunized grand jury testimony is ordered dis-
closed on traditional grounds of compelling, particularized need (which does
not, in any event, include general discovery purposes), the witness' fifth
amendment privilege on deposition necessarily is abrogated as to those ques-
tions flowing directly from the prior, immunized grand jury testimony, which
questions so framed are the inevitable concomitant of access to grand jury
testimony for meaningful impeachment and refreshment of recollection
purposes."'
The district court denied plaintiff's motion for disclosure of
the immunized materials but found an independent basis on which
to compel the witnesses' deposition testimony. Referring to a letter
from the Department of Justice which stated that the federal gov-
ernment had no plans to prosecute the witnesses for any activities
about which they had testified before the grand jury, the court saw
no possibility that the witnesses would be subject to future prose-
cution. Judge Eisele characterized the letter as a "solemn promise"
that operated as a de facto grant of transactional immunity bind-
ing the state as well as the federal government. Thus, he deter-
mined that the recalcitrant witnesses had no legitimate fifth
amendment claims to assert and ordered them to testify at
deposition.84
On appeal the Eighth Circuits framed the issue as whether
the witnesses would subject themselves to a danger of future crimi-
nal prosecution by testifying in the civil case.86 Reviewing the Jus-
tice Department's letter, the court did not find that the federal
government had made any promise not to prosecute. Rather, the
court characterized the letter as a statement of intent made to the
83. Id.
84. Id. at 78,721-24. The district court's reasoning is arguably unsound. The Depart-
ment of Justice, in its letter, expressly refused to confer a second grant of immunity upon
the witnesses in the civil suit because this grant would promote private rather than govern-
mental interests. Even if the federal government did informally confer transactional protec-
tion upon the witnesses, a state prosecutor nevertheless could use their civil testimony un-
less the witnesses received the informal grant specifically for civil proceeding purposes. A
general grant of transactional immunity would not, under Murphy, protect the witnesses
from use of deposition testimony in a state proceeding if the state prosecutor proved that
the civil proceedings were a source of evidence independent of the grand jury statements to
which the federal transactional protection attached.
85. Little Rock School Dist. v. Borden, Inc., 632 F.2d 700 (8th Cir. 1980).
86. Id. at 703.
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lower court, not to the witnesses.8 7 The Eighth Circuit, however,
sustained on other grounds the district court's order compelling
the witnesses' deposition testimony. Although no civil litigant had
access to the witnesses' grand jury statements, the appellate court
ruled that the witnesses' responses to deposition questions would
cover matters contained in their immunized testimony. The wit-
nesses' answers necessarily would derive from those remarks, and
thus would be immunized. 8 The court incorporated the Kuehn de-
cision into its analysis by declaring that if the witnesses responded
voluntarily to the deposition questions, their answers would not
derive from their prior immunized remarks. Since a court order
would compel the witnesses to testify to matters covered in the
grand jury proceedings, however, the repeated testimony would de-
rive from the grand jury statements, which would taint it for fu-
ture use in a criminal action.89 Comparing Little Rock with Star-
key, the Eighth Circuit ruled that a court can only compel the
witnesses to answer questions within the "same time, geographical
and substantive frame work" as the witnesses' immunized testi-
mony. Further, the Eighth Circuit stated that if plaintiff, who was
without access to the immunized materials, could not limit readily
its questioning as directed, then the district court would resolve
any disputes by an in camera examination of the transcripts.90 In
response to the hypothetical charge that its decision condoned ju-
dicial grants of immunity, the Eighth Circuit stated, "We. . . do
no more than is done by the courts when they release previously
secret grand jury proceedings, a function admittedly within our
power."9 1
B. The Corrugated Container Cases
In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation92 differed
from both Starkey and Little Rock in that civil plaintiffs in Corru-
gated were private rather than governmental parties. The Corru-
gated litigation has prompted much debate in the federal courts
over the effect judicial disclosure of immunized testimony and the
subsequent use of this testimony in a deposition should have on a
87. Id. at 704.
88. Id. at 705.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 706.
92. In re Corrugated Container Grand Jury and Corrugated Container Antitrust Crim-
inal and Civil Litig., 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 64,339 (5th Cir. 1981).
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witness' valid fifth amendment claim. The Corrugated litigation
followed a federal grand jury investigation conducted in Texas of
antitrust violations in the corrugated container industry.9 3 The
grand jury returned two indictments, charging both corporate and
individual defendants with violations of the Sherman Act. Some
defendants pleaded nolo contendere while others went to trial and
were acquitted. 9 Many of the witness-employees who testified
before the grand jury did so under a grant of federal use immunity.
When private civil plaintiffs sought later to depose these witnesses,
the witnesses invoked their fifth amendment privilege. Civil plain-
tiffs petitioned the District Court for the Southern District of
Texas, Judge Singleton presiding,95 to disclose the transcripts for
discovery purposes.9" Citing Douglas, Judge Singleton addressed
the secrecy interests at stake and noted that many witnesses had
voluntarily granted their employers access to their immunized
statements during the criminal prosecution.9 7 The court weighed
this circumstance against civil plaintiffs' arguments for disclo-
sure,98 and without addressing whether the witnesses in fact had
valid fifth amendment claims, concluded that, with respect to the
transcripts to which defendants already had access, the need for
disclosure outweighed the need for secrecy. 99 The court ruled that
plaintiffs could use the transcripts at depositions and at trial to
impeach, refresh the memory, and test the credibility of the wit-
nesses. Judge Singleton, however, reserved for a later ruling the
question of the transcripts' admissibility as substantive
evidence.100
93. Id. at 74,573.
94. Id. at 74,573-74.
95. Judge Singleton presided over the federal grand jury investigation of the corru-
gated container industry, the subsequent criminal trial of the corrugated container manufac-
turers, and the civil antitrust class actions and opt-out cases. See In re Corrugated
Container Antitrust Litig., Appeal of Culy, 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 64,272, at 74,176
(D.C. Cir. 1981); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., Appeal of Conboy, 655 F.2d
748, 750 n.1, rev'd en banc, 661 F.2d 1145 (7th Cir. 1981).
96. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,192
(S.D. Tex. 1980), appeals dismissed, In re Corrugated Container Grand Jury and Corru-
gated Container Antitrust Criminal and Civil Litig., 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 64,339 (5th
Cir. 1981).
97. 1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 63,192, at 77,921.
98. The plaintiffs asserted the following reasons for seeking disclosure: to reach a fair
result in the civil suit; to provide plaintiffs and defendants with equal access to transcripts;
and to counter the witnesses' "unjustified and wholesale invocation of their Fifth Amend-





Although upon release of the transcripts civil plaintiffs based
all their civil deposition questions on the immunized materials,
several witnesses again invoked their privilege and refused to an-
swer. Judge Singleton found one recalcitrant witness, Phillip Fleis-
chacker, 1' 1 in civil contempt 02 when he refused to testify even af-
ter the Judge ruled that since the deposition questions derived
from an immunized source, all responses were derivative and hence
tainted for future criminal prosecution purposes. 0 3
Fleischacker appealed the contempt order to the Second Cir-
cuit. Because Fleischacker did not challenge on appeal the propri-
ety of the district court's initial disclosure of the immunized mate-
rial, the appellate court did not rule on that issue.104 In addressing
Fleischacker's fifth amendment claim, the Second Circuit stated
that the standard for determining the applicability of a privilege is
whether "the claimant is confronted by substantial and real,...
not merely trifling or imaginary, hazards of incrimination.' 0 5 The
court examined only whether a prosecutor could use Fleischacker's
answers at deposition (and presumably at civil trial) against him in
a subsequent criminal trial, finding it unnecessary to resolve the
broader question of whether the government could prosecute the
witness in the future for acts admitted to during his civil testi-
mony.10 Recalling Kastigar, the court recognized that in a crimi-
nal proceeding instituted after the defendant has received use im-
munity, the burden is on the government to show that all evidence
originates from a source independent of the compelled testimony.
The Second Circuit acknowledged that if a prosecutor uses immu-
nized testimony to collect evidence against a defendant, the evi-
dence clearly is tainted and cannot be used in the criminal case.
The unresolved issue was whether at a subsequent criminal trial a
prosecutor may use evidence that a civil litigant obtains from im-
munized materials against the witness.07 Referring to the Starkey
101. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., Appeal of Fleischacker, 644 F.2d 70
(2d Cir. 1981).
102. The court stayed the contempt order pending the outcome of Fleischacker's ap-
peal. Id. at 73.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 73 n.3. The Fifth Circuit considered the propriety of the district court's
disclosure decision. The appellate court dismissed the case, ruling that protective orders
against further dissemination of the grand jury records mooted all appeals. See In re Corru-
gated Container Grand Jury and Corrugated Container Antitrust Criminal and Civil Litig.,
1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,339 (5th Cir. 1981).
105. 644 F.2d at 74.
106. Id. at 75.
107. Id. at 76.
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decision, the Second Circuit found that the witness' responses to
questions derived from immunized material are not available for
criminal prosecutorial purposes.108 Consequently, the witness may
not invoke the fifth amendment privilege and refuse to answer
deposition questions. In an interesting footnote the court explained
more fully the basis of its holding, terming it unquestionable that
in cases in which the questioning party has not actually had access
to prior immunized testimony, courts cannot characterize that tes-
timony as a source of questions and thereby find the witness' re-
sponses tainted. If the witness voluntarily responds to the ques-
tions, his answers could be used against him in a subsequent
criminal trial. The Second Circuit declared, however, that if a
questioning party does have access to prior immunized testimony,
and the witness voluntarily responds, then despite the witness'
failure to assert a privilege, courts should rule against admissibility
of the response if the questions concerned the same subject matter
as the immunized testimony.10° Consistent with this analysis, the
court, in another footnote, distinguished Kuehn from Fleischacker
on two grounds. First, while the questioning reporter in Kuehn did
not have access to the witness' prior immunized remarks, civil
plaintiffs in Fleischacker did have prior access. Second, the Kuehn
witness voluntarily answered the reporter's questions, whereas the
court was compelling Fleischacker, over his fifth amendment objec-
tion, to respond to civil plaintiffs' questions. Thus, the Second Cir-
cuit concluded that if plaintiffs deposed Fleischacker, his remarks
would be protected. 110
In an effort to rebut the argument that the court itself was
granting immunity, the Second Circuit characterized its holding as
merely an assessment of the correctness of a witness' invocation of
privilege."' In contrast, the court noted that de facto immunity
does inhere in the rule which provides that if a district court errs
in its finding on the existence of a privilege, an after-the-fact ex-
clusionary rule operates to prohibit use of the wrongfully com-
108. Id. at 77.
109. Id. at 79 n.14.
110. Id. at 76 n.11.
111. Id. at 78. The court stated:
We are satisfied that compelling a witness to answer questions a second time that were
previously answered under a grant of immunity does not result in an expansion of the
original grant of immunity. Rather, such responses would come within the original stat-
utory immunity grant because, by necessity, they would derive from the original immu-
nized testimony. Thus, no de facto grant of immunity will have occurred.
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pelled testimony against the witness. The Second Circuit specified
that this rule is remedial in nature and cannot be used to support
a finding that otherwise would violate a witness' fifth amendment
right.112
The Second Circuit did concede that by compelling a witnesss
to answer questions broader in scope than those originally asked
during the grand jury proceedings, a court might jeopardize the
government's future ability to prosecute the immunized witness.111
In order to limit potential interference with prosecutorial objec-
tives, the Second Circuit narrowed the district court's holding to
compel Fleischacker to respond only to questions concerning "spe-
cific topics that actually were touched upon" by the questions
asked during the witness' original immunized testimony.
1 4
Starkey and Fleischacker notwithstanding, two circuits have
refused to permit judicial disclosure and civil use of immunized
materials to abrogate an otherwise valid fifth amendment claim.
Consider the case of Charles J. Franey. Prior to the Corrugated
criminal trial, Franey, an employee of one of the corporate defen-
dants, 15 agreed to an interview with the Department of Justice,
relying upon a letter from the Department promising that it would
not use any information revealed by Franey against him in a crimi-
nal prosecution. 1 6 The government used a transcription of
Franey's interview as evidence in the grand jury investigation of
the corrugated container industry. Franey later testified during the
criminal trial under a formal grant of statutory use immunity. In
the civil suit plaintiffs based deposition questions on both immu-
nized sources but Franey refused to respond, invoking his privilege
against self-incrimination.11 7 Judge Singleton held Franey in civil
contempt, declaring that by compelling him to testify the court
was not extending Franey's prior immunity grants but, rather, was
merely making a judicial determination that his refusal to answer
112. Id. at 78 n.13. In Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179, 181 (1954), Justice Black
identified the constitutional source for the remedial rule. Speaking for the Court, he stated,
"a witness does not need any statute to protect him from the use of self-incriminating testi-
mony he is compelled to give over his objection. The Fifth Amendment takes care of that
without a statute."
113. 644 F.2d at 79.
114. Id.
115. Franey was an employee of Mead Corporation.
116. See In re Corrugated Container Anti-trust Litig., Appeal of Franey, 620 F.2d
1086 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981).
117. 620 F.2d at 1088-89.
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questions based on his fear of future prosecution was invalid."'
Judge Singleton ruled that since all deposition questions either
were verbatim remarks taken from the immunized material or were
so closely related in subject matter that they clearly derived there-
from, Franey's responses would be inadmissible against him in any
future prosecution. Moreover, the court noted:
In the extremely unlikely event that Mr. Franey is ever prosecuted by any
sovereignty for matters raised by his answers to these questions, the prosecu-
tor will have the heavy burden of proving that his case was derived wholly
from independent evidence, and that burden could not be met as to this dep-
osition testimony.11'
Unlike the witness in Kuehn, Franey's repetition of immunized
testimony would not constitute a waiver of immunity because
Franey had asserted his privilege. Thus, any testimony he gave
thereafter would be pursuant to court order and hence,
involuntary.2 0
The Fifth Circuit in In re Corrugated Container Anti-trust
Litigation, Appeal of Franey2' vacated the district court's order
that held Franey in civil contempt. Like Fleischacker, Franey did
not challenge the propriety of Judge Singleton's disclosure deci-
sion, so the Fifth Circuit did not address that issue.' 2 The appel-
late court used a traditional mode of analysis that consisted of a
two-part test to assess the validity of Franey's claim of privilege.
The court first had to determine whether the witness' responses
might tend to reveal his engagement in criminal activities. If no
such incrimination were possible, the court would compel Franey
to answer the deposition questions. If, however, the witness' an-
swers might be incriminating, the court had to decide whether a
risk (even a remote one) of criminal prosecution existed for acts
that the witness admitted during the course of the testimony. 2 3
The court found that Franey's claim satisfied both prongs of the
test since his responses to the deposition questions might reveal
118. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 63,279, at
78,430 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. 620 F.2d 1086 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981).
122. Id. at 1089 n.2.
123. Id. at 1091-92. The Fifth Circuit developed this two-part test in reliance upon
Wehling v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 608 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1979), and In re Folding
Carton Antitrust Litig., 609 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1979). Both cases articulated standards for
district courts to use in assessing the validity of a witness' claim of privilege. The cases




his violation of both federal and state criminal antitrust laws, and
no showing had been made that all applicable statutes of limita-
tion had run.12 The Fifth Circuit noted that a court could compel
a witness to answer despite a valid fifth amendment claim only if a
party to the civil action had authority to and did confer a separate
grant of immunity upon the witness. Since neither the federal nor
the state government was a party to the civil suit, this option was
not available. 12 5 The Fifth Circuit found that the district court had
misconstrued its role with respect to the federal immunity statute.
The appellate court stated that, in addressing Franey's fifth
amendment claim, Judge Singleton should have limited inquiries
to whether the witness' responses would incriminate him and sub-
ject him to possible future prosecution. Prior grants of immunity,
according to the Fifth Circuit, were not relevant to this question.' 2
Concerning the district court's determination that Franey's re-
sponses necessarily would be inadmissible in a criminal prosecu-
tion, the Fifth Circuit ruled that a district court should make this
ruling only when the witness has been indicted and a prosecutor
seeks to use evidence against him in a criminal proceeding. Citing
Kastigar, the court stated that since the government bears the
burden of showing an absence of taint, a court should not decide
the admissibility issue unless the prosecution is a party to the ac-
tion before the court. 27
The Fifth Circuit criticized the district court's holding on gen-
eral policy grounds, noting that once a witness testifies under a
grant of use immunity, the district court's rationale would permit
innumerable subsequent abrogations of the witness' claim of privi-
lege. The Fifth Circuit viewed with disfavor the foreseeable conse-
quences of continued denial of a witness' fifth amendment claim.
A court's role ... would be to probe the mind of the questioner to ascertain
that he is familiar with the substance of the immunized testimony. Even if
the questioner were ignorant of the prior testimony, the court could ensure
"taint," and thus compel the witness to answer, by seeing to it-as the court
did here-that the questioner had a transcript of the immunized testimony
on which to "base" his questions.2 8
The Fifth Circuit further warned that even if a district court's de-
termination of taint clearly is incorrect, a court order compelling
124. 620 F.2d at 1092.
125. Id. at 1092 & n.5.
126. Id. at 1093.
127. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 29-30.
128. 620 F.2d at 1093 (emphasis added).
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the witness to respond would immunize his testimony automati-
cally because of the after-the-fact exclusionary rule, which pre-
vents use of wrongly compelled testimony against a witness. 129 The
Fifth Circuit foresaw a proliferation of tainted testimony that ef-
fectively would preclude the government from ever meeting its
heavy burden of proving that the evidence it presented in a subse-
quent criminal prosecution of the witness derived from an inde-
pendent source. The court concluded that the district court im-
properly had undermined the policies of the federal statute by
usurping the prosecutor's power thereunder to initiate a grant of
immunity.130
Judge Singleton's actions in the case of John Conboy
prompted an equally condemning response from the Seventh Cir-
cuit. Like Phillip Fleischacker, Conboy testified before the federal
grand jury investigating the corrugated container industry, pursu-
ant to a grant of statutory use immunity.131 Conboy refused to re-
peat his testimony during a civil deposition, even though plaintiffs
were basing their questions on the witness' released immunized
grand jury statements. Judge Singleton ordered Conboy to cooper-
ate and upon his refusal held him in contempt of court.
132
On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, the three judges who were
sitting2 3 affirmed the district court's ruling.1'3  On rehearing en
banc, however, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's
holding.135 Speaking for the majority, Judge Sprecher identified
two fundamental issues. First, the court had to determine whether
Conboy still was subject to prosecution for engaging in criminal
129. Id. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
130. 620 F.2d at 1094-95.
131. See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., Appeal of Conboy, 655 F.2d 748,
749-50, rev'd en banc, 661 F.2d 1145 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. granted sub nora. Pillsbury Co. v.
Conboy, 102 S. Ct. 998 (1982). Conboy was a former employee of Weyerhaeuser Company.
132. 655 F.2d at 750. The court stayed the contempt order pending appeal.
133. The three judges who heard the case were Chief Judge Cummings, Senior Circuit
Judge Swygert, and Circuit Judge Sprecher. Judge Sprecher's lengthy dissent became the
majority opinion in the case upon rehearing en banc.
134. Citing Fleischacker, Starkey, and Little Rock, the court held that Conboy's re-
sponses to questions derived from his immunized testimony could not be used against him
in any criminal proceeding, and thus Conboy could not properly invoke his fifth amendment
privilege. Refuting the notion that its holding constituted a judicial grant of de facto immu-
nity, the court declared that it merely interpreted the scope of Conboy's previous grant of
immunity. In a footnote the court distinguished Kuehn from the instant case by stressing
that the witness in Kuehn repeated testimony voluntarily, whereas the court sought to com-
pel Conboy to do so. Id. at 749-54.
135. 661 F.2d 1145 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. granted sub nom. Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy,
102 S. Ct. 998 (1982).
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activities to which his immunized testimony referred. Second, if
Conboy was subject to criminal proceedings, the court had to de-
cide whether Conboy's fifth amendment privilege could be abro-
gated upon a judicial determination that his answers at deposition
would derive from an immunized source and, therefore, would not
be usable against him in a criminal case.1 36 Addressing the first
issue, the Seventh Circuit found that although the federal statute
of limitations for antitrust violations had run, Conboy still was
subject to both a federal conspiracy charge and a state antitrust
charge. Thus, irrespective of his previous immunity grant, Conboy
did have a valid fifth amendment claim to assert.137 The court be-
gan its discussion of the second issue by distinguishing between
statutory use immunity and the remedial rule that allows exclusion
after-the-fact of evidence that a court has compelled in violation of
the fifth amendment. Judge Sprecher accused the district court of
confusing the two concepts.'3 8 Referring to Kastigar and Kuehn,
the Seventh Circuit declared that use immunity protects the
source, not the substance of information. Thus, the witness who
receives immunity in one proceeding cannot repeat the testimony
elsewhere without incriminating himself and simultaneously creat-
ing an independent source of information that the government can
use against him in a criminal prosecution.'3 9 The after-the-fact ex-
clusionary rule, on the other hand, merely allows a court to declare
retroactively that an erroneous ruling was made on a witness' fifth
amendment claim and, consequently, that the prosecution cannot
use the wrongfully compelled testimony against the witness in a
criminal case. Criticizing Fleischacker, the court warned against
improperly imputing taint to deposition responses when only depo-
sition questions derive from immunized testimony. According to
Judge Sprecher, John Conboy's deposition answers would derive
from his own "current, independent memory of events" rather
than from his prior testimony and would constitute a new, un-
tainted source of evidence.140 After attacking the district court,
Judge Sprecher accused the Second Circuit of engaging in the
practice of granting de facto immunity. Judge Sprecher argued
that regardless of the correctness of the Second Circuit's determi-
136. Id. at 1149. Like the Fleischacker and Franey decisions, the propriety of the dis-
trict court's initial disclosure decision was neither challenged nor discussed.
137. Id. at 1151-53.
138. Id. at 1154.
139. Id. at 1154-55.
140. Id. at 1155 (emphasis by the court).
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nation of Fleischacker's privilege, the government could never use
Fleischacker's compelled testimony against him in a criminal case.
Although the Second Circuit believed its decision about taint was
correct, Judge Sprecher argued that in reality the Second Circuit
relied on its own remedial exclusionary power to evaluate the va-
lidity of Fleischacker's claim of privilege;141 hence, the correctness
of its determination of taint was irrelevant. The Second Circuit's
Fleischacker decision was a "'self-fulfilling prophecy that in sub-
stance can only be viewed as a grant of immunity .... outside
the scope of judicial authority.' "142
Judge Sprecher elaborated upon what he considered to be the
fundamental error in the Fleischacker and Conboy holdings. The
courts in these decisions premised the order compelling the wit-
ness' testimony on a judicial prediction that if future criminal
prosecution ensued, the presiding court would find the witness'
testimony from the civil suit tainted and hence inadmissible. Judge
Sprecher declared that since no governmental prosecutor was party
to the civil suit, no one could guarantee the future exclusion of the
witness' deposition testimony. Judge Sprecher pointed out that if
this judicial prediction did not bind all courts, then the witness
would not receive the coextensive protection required to supplant
the fifth amendment privilege. Conversely, if the prospective deter-
mination of taint was binding on all courts, then both the district
court and the Second Circuit improperly transformed statutory use
immunity into de facto judicial transactional immunity.143 Judge
Sprecher concluded that the district court's ruling relied on too
141. Id. at 1156.
142. Id. (quoting Ellis v. United States, 416 F.2d 791, 796 (D.C. Cir. 1969)) (emphasis
by the Seventh Circuit). In Ellis the district court did use the remedial rule as before-the-
fact justification for overruling a recalcitrant witness' otherwise valid claim of privilege. The
District of Columbia Circuit stated:
We are not here concerned with a case where a judge has made a mistake in apply-
ing legal rules, like a case where he erroneously rules that a witness has waived his
privilege. In the case before us the judge did not purport to deny that the witness had
correctly presented a claim of privilege. He merely asserted that the witness would
nevertheless be protected. . . against prosecution based on his testimony.
416 F.2d at 796.
143. 661 F.2d at 1157. Judge Sprecher also remarked on the impractical aspects of the
district court's holding in Conboy, pointing out that if Conboy's responses upon deposition
varied even slightly from his original immunized answers, he would face a possible waiver
problem which in turn could provide leads to incriminating facts not touched upon in his
original grand jury statements. In final remarks Judge Sprecher opined that compulsion of
Conboy's testimony probably was unnecessary since Conboy had rendered himself "unavail-
able" by asserting his privilege and thus, Rule 804 of the Federal Rules of Evidence would
operate to permit introduction of the grand jury transcript itself at trial. Id. at 1158.
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many uncertainties concerning Conboy's risk of future criminal
prosecution and subsequent use of civil deposition testimony





Judge Eisele in Little Rock warned that courts should not dis-
close immunized materials to civil litigants as a means of overrid-
ing a witness' otherwise valid claim of fifth amendment privilege. 1 45
Judge Eisele correctly contended that when a civil plaintiff seeks
immunized materials, courts must consider the merit of a witness'
asserted claim before making a disclosure decision. In the Corru-
gated cases witnesses' invocations of privilege were the motivating
factor behind the civil litigants' motion for release; yet, Judge Sin-
gleton, following the guidelines articulated by the Supreme Court
in Douglas, made a disclosure decision without considering either
that the materials to be released were immunized rather than
nonimmunized, or the possible effect that disclosure might have on
the witnesses' claim of privilege.146 The court did not address the
effect of disclosure upon a fifth amendment claim until after it had
decided to release the immunized materials and a witness persisted
in claiming a privilege.1 47 This approach resulted in an unjustified
bifurcation of what should be a single-stage process.
Certainly, a court should consider the secrecy interests out-
lined in the Douglas decision before it makes any disclosure deci-
sion. A decision like Corrugated, however, is nonsensical when it
relies solely upon a plaintiff's showing, under Douglas criteria, of a
"particularized need." Under Douglas a civil litigant's need for dis-
closure -would outweigh the need for secrecy if the civil litigant
could show that he required the grand jury testimony to impeach
or to refresh the recollection of a witness. 46 If a witness, however,
chooses to remain silent, a court cannot release his testimony for
impeachment or refreshment purposes unless it determines first
that he has asserted invalidly his claim of fifth amendment
144. Id. at 1159.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 81-83.
146. See supra notes 92-100 and accompanying text.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 101-03, 115-20, & 131-32.
148. Indeed, the district court released the transcripts in the Corrugated case for this




Analysis of the problem from a prosecutorial perspective is in-
structive. If the recalcitrant witness is subject to possible future
prosecution, a prosecutor necessarily maintains the right to insti-
tute criminal proceedings against him. The preservation of this
right depends directly upon the extent to which others may use the
witness' immunized testimony.150 Indeed, as the federal courts
have suggested, release of immunized materials to a civil litigant
always raises a potential Kastigar issue of whether derivation from
a protected source of certain evidence in the civil case taints that
evidence for subsequent prosecutorial purposes. If a potential for
taint exists, then a prosecutor seeking to preserve a criminal case
against a witness has an interest in preventing judicial disclosure
of the witness' immunized testimony for use in civil litigation. This
Recent Development submits that when a witness' claim of privi-
lege against self-incrimination prompts a civil plaintiff to move for
disclosure of the witness' immunized grand jury testimony, the
court, in addition to evaluating the traditional secrecy interests
outlined in Douglas, must weigh the prosecutorial interest in con-
tinued secrecy of immunized materials 151 against the civil litigant's
need for their release. This balancing necessarily requires that the
court determine whether the recalcitrant witness has asserted val-
idly a privilege, that is, whether the witness is subject to prosecu-
tion for criminal acts about which the civil plaintiffs wish him to
testify.152 If the witness' fifth amendment claim is valid, then the
government possesses an interest in the continued secrecy of the
immunized testimony. The court next must evaluate whether dis-
closure to civil plaintiffs necessarily will interfere with that
prosecutorial interest by increasing substantially the government's
149. Disclosure of nonimmunized grand jury testimony for impeachment/refreshment
purposes despite a witness' fifth amendment assertion appears equally nonsensical. The
practical consequences, however, would be less serious since a court subsequently would not
be able to use the fact of disclosure or the fact of the civil litigant's use of the grand jury
testimony to justify overruling the witness' claim.
150. See Strachan, supra note 35, at 822.
[I]n any case in which immunized disclosures are made in the course of a public pro-
ceeding or otherwise made public, perhaps through grand jury "leaks," it will be diffi-
cult to convince courts that all persons charged with building the case and prosecuting
the witness have managed to avoid knowledge of or access to the immunized testimony.
Id. (citations omitted).
151. The author contends that the prosecutor's secrecy interest in immunized grand
jury materials is separate and distinct from the other secrecy interests outlined in the Doug-
las opinion. See supra text accompanying notes 45-46.
152. See supra notes 15 & 122-23 and accompanying text.
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burden of proving in a future criminal prosecution of the witness
that all evidence derives from an independent source. A court
should avoid disclosure when interference is inevitable.
As the Supreme Court noted in Douglas, a plaintiff's burden
of justifying the release of the immunized grand jury testimony di-
minishes as the need for secrecy declines.15 For example, if a state
or federal attorney is a party to a civil suit and moves for disclo-
sure, the secrecy interest is reduced, since by seeking to make use
of a protected source of evidence, the government consents in ef-
fect to any tainting of the evidence in the civil suit.15 4 This may
operate as a second grant of use immunity, albeit informal, binding
upon other jurisdictions. Therefore, given facts similar to those in
Starkey and Little Rock, and absent any other secrecy interests, 55
a court justifiably might discount a witness' fifth amendment claim
and release his immunized testimony for impeachment/refresh-
ment purposes in response to a government attorney's motion for
disclosure. A court, however, should base that decision on the gov-
ernment's identity as the civil movant rather than on any judicial
predictions of taint.
Prior disclosure of immunized statements may diminish the
153. See supra text accompanying notes 48-49.
154. This notion derives from the Seventh Circuit's holding in Patrick v. United
States, 524 F.2d 1109 (7th Cir. 1975). On the basis of Patrick's immunized grand jury testi-
mony, the government brought suit against him for unpaid taxes on his gambling receipts.
Patrick argued that by forcing him to institute a refund suit to challenge the government's
action against him, the government was infringing upon his fifth amendment privilege. The
court rejected this argument, stating:
[O]n the facts alleged by Patrick, such later testimony would be elicited only because
the government could use the grand jury testimony as a basis for the assessment. Thus,
any testimony elicited in the tax proceeding would be "information... indirectly de-
rived from . . . testimony" compelled under the original immunity grant and thus
could not be used against Patrick in any criminal proceeding. Such derivative use im-
munity, of course, would also prevent state prosecuting authorities from using the
testimony.
Id. at 1120 (citations omitted) (quoting Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 448-49
(1972)). The Fifth Circuit in Franey made a similar observation when it noted that although
it disagreed with the Eighth Circuit's rationale in Starkey, the result in Starkey might be
correct because the civil plaintiff was a state attorney who admitted that the compelled
testimony would be inadmissible against the witness in a future criminal prosecution. The
Franey court, however, did point out that the state was Starkey's only potential prosecutor.
Assuming that threats to other secrecy interests do not exist, this author would condone
allowing state attorney access to federal grand jury material even if the possibility of federal
prosecution of the witness still exists, since a state could formally extend immunity to a
witness in exchange for his civil testimony. See 620 F.2d at 1092-93.
155. Naturally, a governmental entity's motion for disclosure does not in itself justify
release if release might threaten the general secrecy interests outlined in Douglas. See supra
text accompanying note 46.
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government's secrecy interest. As Starkey and Corrugated illus-
trate,156 a corporate defendant occasionally will have had access,
through court order or otherwise, to the immunized grand jury tes-
timony of an employee-witness during the criminal prosecution of
a case. Conceivably, if this corporate defendant is later sued on the
related civil matter, a court may impute knowledge of the sub-
stance of the witness' grand jury testimony to the defendant. This
could taint the civil proceeding as a source of evidence usable
against the witness in a criminal trial. Disclosure in this instance,
therefore, would be permissible, even if the civil litigant is a pri-
vate party, because any potential interference with a prosecutor's
rights against the immunized witness already has occurred. Thus,
judicial release of the witness' immunized statements to private
civil plaintiffs would not necessarily increase the government's bur-
den in a subsequent criminal prosecution of the witness. A sub-
stantial difference exists, however, between releasing immunized
testimony to private civil plaintiffs for discovery purposes in order
to equalize access between the parties, and releasing it for the spe-
cific purposes of impeaching and refreshing a witness' memory as
Judge Singleton did, despite the witness' assertion of a claim of
privilege. The former results in the mere possibility of tainted evi-
dence in the civil suit, whereas the latter contemplates inevitable
taint by nullification of the witness' privilege and results in confer-
ral of a second grant of immunity.
In the former case, assuming that a court does not order the
witness to testify in the civil case and that all parties in the suit
have had access to the witness' immunized statements, if a prose-
cutor attempts to introduce evidence from the civil suit in a later
criminal proceeding against the witness, then the criminal court
might find the evidence tainted, and thus inadmissible. In that sit-
uation, until the prosecutor proceeds against the witness and the
156. See supra text accompanying notes 71-72 & 95-97. In Starkey the court granted
the defendant corporation access pursuant to Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure, which provides in part:
Where the defendant is a corporation, partnership, association or labor union, the court
may grant the defendant, upon its motion, discovery of relevant recorded testimony of
any witness before a grand jury who (1) was, at the time of his testimony, so situated as
an officer or employee as to have been able legally to bind the defendant in respect to
conduct constituting the offense, or (2) was, at the time of the offense, personally in-
volved in the alleged conduct constituting the offense and so situated as an officer or
employee as to have been able legally to bind the defendant in respect to that alleged
conduct in which he was involved.
FED. R. CraM. P. 16(a)(1)(A). See Little Rock School Dist. v. Borden, 1978-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 1 62,020, at 74,375 (E.D. Ark. 1978).
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criminal court rules on the issue, only a possibility exists that judi-
cial release of the immunized testimony will create tainted evi-
dence in the criminal suit. When, however, the court in charge of
the civil suit compels the witness to respond and bases the decision
on a prediction of the future inadmissibility of that testimony in a
criminal proceeding, the civil court usurps the criminal court's role.
Because of the after-the-fact exclusionary rule, the civil court's rul-
ing on the witness' privilege, regardless of its correctness, protects
the witness from use of the judicially compelled testimony against
him in a later criminal proceeding. In this situation, the certainty
of taint, and hence immunity, accrues during the civil suit.
Perhaps in the Corrugated cases Judge Singleton believed that
defendants' prior access to the testimony served to taint all evi-
dence in the civil proceeding, thereby negating the witnesses' fifth
amendment claims even before the plaintiffs moved for disclosure.
To equate litigant access to immunized testimony with automatic
taint, however, encourages judicial abuse of the disclosure power
since a court can always provide access through disclosure and
thus extend immunity whenever circumstances in the civil pro-
ceeding require it. Furthermore, the Kuehn decision, which held
that the voluntariness of a witness' responses can dissipate taint,
belies the notion that access alone guarantees immunity.
A court may disclose immunized materials to private litigants
for the limited purpose of equalizing access to testimony. Policy
and logic, however, require that if impeachment and/or refresh-
ment of memory are the only purposes for which a private civil
litigant seeks disclosure, 157 then, a witness' valid assertion of a
157. In most cases in which judicial disclosure of grand jury materials is made, the
articulated purposes are impeachment and/or refreshment of a witness' memory. See Doug-
las Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211 (1979); Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S.
855 (1966); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395 (1959); United States
v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958); State v. Sarbaugh, 552 F.2d 768 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom. J.L. Simmons Co. v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 889 (1977); Little Rock School
Dist. v. Borden, Inc., 1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 62,020 (E.D. Ark. 1978). An exception is
Judge Singleton's most recent disclosure decision in In re Corrugated Container Antitrust
Litig., 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) V 64,287 (S.D. Tex. 1981). In that case the corporate defen-
dant in the civil suit was MacMillan Bloedel, a company that was never criminally indicted.
Several of its employees did testify before the grand jury under a grant of immunity and
two employees later testified at the criminal trial of Corrugated defendants. At a subse-
quent civil deposition MacMillan Bloedel's employees refused to answer any questions by
invoking their fifth amendment privilege. Even though MacMillan Bloedel never had access
to the grand jury transcripts of its employees, Judge Singleton found that the civil plaintiffs
had shown a "compelling need" for the transcripts that outweighed any secrecy interests.
The court stated, "the Fifth Amendment wall makes it impossible to develop facts of the
case either through MacMillan Bloedel's own employees or through other members of the
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privilege, made prior to a court's ruling on the disclosure motion,
must preclude judicial release of the witness' testimony regardless
of earlier disclosure to other parties in the civil litigation.
B. Prospective Taint Determinations
Circumstances may require a court to evaluate a witness' claim
of privilege after disclosure of his immunized testimony already
has occurred. 158 In Little Rock Judge Eisele argued that while ab-
rogation of the fifth amendment privilege could not serve as
before-the-fact justification for civil disclosure, a judicial finding of
abrogation might be justified if disclosure were a fait accompli.1 59
The court's distinction has proved to be without merit since the
potential for judicial abuse is the same in both situations. An anal-
ysis of the Second Circuit's holding in Fleischacker and the Eighth
Circuit's holding in Starkey'" supports this conclusion.
The Second Circuit noted in Fleischacker that the voluntary
repetition of immunized testimony does not preclude necessarily
the testimony's subsequent exclusion on grounds of taint if the
questioning party has had prior access to the witness' remarks. In
that event, however, since the witness does not assert his privilege,
the court presiding over the civil case has no occasion to rule on
the question of taint. Only if and when the government seeks to
introduce evidence from the civil suit in a later criminal prosecu-
tion of the witness, will a court have an opportunity to decide the
taint issue. Until then, litigant access to a witness' immunized
statements creates only a likelihood that the evidence will be inad-
missible against the witness in criminal court.1 61 When, however,
the witness does assert his privilege in the civil suit, the courts
have found it proper to address the issue of taint at that time.
Moreover, the Second 62 and Eighth 63 Circuits have construed
industry who may have had dealings with MacMillan Bloedel." Id. at 74,301; see also Sugar
Antitrust Litig., 1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 61,808 (N.D. Cal. 1977); United States v. Bor-
den, Inc., 1976-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 61,177 (D. Ariz. 1976).
158. See supra text accompanying notes 71-72.
159. See supra text accompanying note 83.
160. As stated previously, the results in the Eighth Circuit's Starkey and Little Rock
decisions are justifiable on the ground that the civil plaintiff was a governmental entity
rather than a private litigant. See supra note 154 and accompanying text. This Recent De-
velopment, however, focuses on the Eighth Circuit's reasoning in both cases and attempts to
assess the broader implications of these holdings. Certainly, the Fleischacker decision illus-
trates that the Eighth Circuit rationale is being applied in civil suits even when a govern-
ment attorney is not a party.
161. See supra text accompanying note 109.
162. See supra text accompanying note 110.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 69 & 89.
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Kuehn to enable them to predict taint with what they believe is
certainty. As a result, they have abandoned as unnecessary any
consideration of otherwise valid claims of privilege. This Recent
Development views the new approach as an invalid substitute for
traditional fifth amendment analysis.
Under ordinary circumstances, a witness who refuses to an-
swer on grounds of self-incrimination triggers judicial considera-
tion of the validity of his claim. A court determines whether the
witness' statements would be incriminating and whether the act of
testifying would subject the witness to a danger of future prosecu-
tion.164 The outcome of the court's examination is dependent only
on its findings with respect to those two issues. If the court's ruling
on the witness' privilege is incorrect, the witness' initial refusal will
protect him against incriminating use of his compelled testimony
by triggering the remedial exclusionary rule.6 5
By contrast, once a court has granted civil litigants access to
immunized grand jury testimony and a witness invokes his privi-
lege, the judicial practice, as articulated by the Second and Eighth
Circuits, is to ignore the two standard fifth amendment issues."'
Instead, courts employ the following reasoning: in questioning the
witness civil plaintiffs intend to use immunized material that may
or may not taint the evidence for future prosecutorial purposes,
depending to a large extent upon whether the witness' responses
are compelled or voluntary. Since the witness in Kuehn created an
independent source of evidence by voluntarily repeating the sub-
stance of his immunized testimony to a person without access to
that testimony, if the court compels the witness to respond to
questions posed by a party with access to his immunized testi-
mony, the presumption of taint is unquestionable, rendering the
civil testimony unusable against the witness in any criminal pro-
ceeding. According to Kastigar, use immunity offers protection co-
extensive with a fifth amendment claim; therefore, the court can
override the recalcitrant witness' claim of privilege and compel him
to testify without violating his fifth amendment rights.16 7
The inherent fallacy in this analytical process goes beyond the
possibility, suggested by Judge Sprecher of the Seventh Circuit,
164. See supra notes 15 & 123 and accompanying text.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 111-12.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 64-65 & 105-06.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 66-69, 107-08, & 110.
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that the judicial prediction could be wrong."' 8 A court is always
subject to error in ruling on the existence of a privilege. For this
reason, the remedial exclusionary rule exists to protect a witness
who invokes the fifth amendment. The courts are doing more, how-
ever, than making predictions. If a court were to rule that a wit-
ness' responses to questions derived from his own immunized testi-
mony would always be tainted and, therefore, the witness could
not claim a privilege, then the court would be making an error in
judgment about what constitutes derivative use. '69 When, however,
a court tells a witness that his responses necessarily will be tainted
because the court will compel them over the witness' objection, the
court is conditioning the nullification of the witness' right on its
own judicial act. In short, an abuse of judicial power occurs that is
of no less magnitude than when a court discloses immunized testi-
mony in order to create tainted evidence.
Courts are being disingenuous when they characterize their ac-
tions as mere evaluations of the scope of derivative use. 70 As the
Fifth Circuit noted in Franey, proper determination of derivative
use occurs only when the government is in fact bringing a criminal
prosecution against the previously immunized witness.1 7 ' The court
then examines the two existing pieces of evidence and decides
whether the evidence the government seeks to introduce derives
from the immunized source and hence is inadmissible in the crimi-
nal case. The court neither creates evidence nor negates the wit-
ness' claimed privilege, and interference with prosecutorial inter-
ests occurs only in the exclusion of a particular piece of evidence.
The judicial ruling does not extend the scope of the original immu-
nity grant, which would increase the government's burden of prov-
ing that the next piece of evidence it introduces derives from an
independent source. By contrast, the court in a civil action exam-
ines one immunized source and decides that by compelling testi-
mony a second tainted source of evidence will result, which will
negate the witness' claimed privilege. Thus the court engages di-
rectly in the creation of immunity, not merely in the determina-
168. See supra text accompanying note 143.
169. Certainly we would criticize the court for allowing a mere possibility of taint to
override a witness' otherwise valid fifth amendment privilege. Judge Sprecher's criticism of
the Fleischacker decision focused essentially on his disagreement with the Second Circuit's
notion of what constitutes derivative use. See supra text accompanying notes 139-40.
170. See supra text accompanying note 68.
171. See supra text accompanying note 127.
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tion of derivative use.17 2
In an effort to lessen interference with prosecutorial objec-
tives, the Second and Eighth Circuits have limited the permissible
substantive scope of deposition questions posed by civil litigants in
order to prevent the responding witness from revealing new, in-
criminating facts.17 3 This remedial measure, however, fails to rec-
ognize that the government's burden of proving an independent
source of evidence is a function not only of the substantive content
of the evidence, but also of the number of and public access to the
immunized sources. 74 Thus, judicial compulsion of a witness to re-
peat his immunized testimony on grounds that it will be automati-
cally tainted inevitably conflicts with an executive function. When
the civil plaintiff is itself a governmental entity, as in Starkey, the
interference with prosecutorial objectives decreases. To apply the
Starkey analysis to cases such as Fleischacker, however, in which
the litigants are private parties, results in the improper exercise of
judicial power. If, as Starkey suggests, one may equate "derivative
use" of immunized testimony with automatic taint, and if courts
may ensure "derivative use" by exercising disclosure and compul-
sion powers, then a witness never will be able to assert a fifth
172. Title 18 of the United States Code, § 6005, which permits congressional grants of
immunity, recognizes that grants of immunity increase the prosecutor's burden of proving
that evidence is derived legitimately. Section 6005 provides that the Attorney General must
receive notice of the intent to request an order for immunization 10 days prior to the date of
the actual request for an order, and upon the prosecutor's request, the district court can
defer issuance of an order for 20 days. The District of Columbia Circuit has construed the
purpose of this notice provision as follows:
[T]he. . . Congress did recognize the seriousness of immunization against punishment
for crime and the potential adverse effect the conferring of immunity might have on
criminal law enforcement. It was with the intent of minimizing any prejudicial impact
on present and future law enforcement plans that the provision requiring notice of
intended immunization was adopted. It was expected that timely notice would allow
the Attorney General to assess the effect of a grant of immunity on investigations or
prosecutions and then, should he feel it necessary, communicate with the concerned
House of Congress or committee to "lobby" for a modification of immunity plans. ...
It was also anticipated that a period of time... would permit the Attorney General to
"insulate from the immunity grant any incriminating data already in his files prior to
the witness' testimony.". . . Thus, though he is accorded no right to be heard in court
in opposition to an immunity request, the Attorney General is given some protection in
his role as the administrator of Federal law enforcement by the notice requirement of §
6005.
In re United States Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities, 361 F. Supp.
1270, 1277-78 (D.C. Cir. 1973). For examples of how prosecutors have tried to "insulate"
independently derived evidence, see Strachan, supra note 35, at 812 n.97, 814 n.107, & 822
n.137.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 70, 90, & 114.
174. See Strachan, supra note 35, at 822.
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amendment privilege in a civil suit. The Fleischacker decision en-
courages courts to expedite civil discovery for private plaintiffs by
annihilating the government's statutorily protected interest in pre-
serving its right to prosecute the immunized witness.
The disclosure guidelines that this Recent Development pro-
poses would serve as a partial check on unfettered judicial
discretion since consideration of asserted claims, and hence of
prosecutorial secrecy interests, would precede release of immu-
nized grand jury testimony. If courts, however, apply the Eighth
Circuit's analysis in Little Rock1'7 to purely private civil suits, then
simply by compelling a witness to respond over his fifth amend-
ment objection, courts will be able to create tainted evidence and
thus extend grants of immunity even absent prior judicial disclo-
sure. In fact, the Little Rock court characterized compulsion as an
alternative method of accomplishing the same results obtained by
judicial disclosure of immunized materials, implying that a court
faced with en masse invocations of privilege can expedite progress
of the civil suit either by releasing the witnesses' immunized grand
jury testimony or by compelling witnesses to respond to questions
about the substance of their immunized testimony. To permit civil
plaintiffs' needs to override a witness' valid fifth amendment claim
in this manner is to allow courts to usurp the executive function,
contravening the letter and spirit of the federal use immunity stat-
ute.1 7 6 This Recent Development recommends that courts abandon
the practice of making prospective taint determinations and return
to traditional modes of evaluating witnesses' claims of privilege.
Prior disclosure of immunized materials may justify using them for
substantive' 7 or other purposes in the civil suit. When the civil
175. See supra text accompanying notes 88-89.
176. The author recognizes that judicial grants of immunity in the criminal trial con-
text might be justifiable on due process grounds. When a defendant seeks to compel testi-
mony of a witness who can provide exculpatory evidence, but the witness asserts his fifth
amendment privilege and the prosecutor refuses to grant the witness use immunity, the
defendant's due process rights may require judicial intervention to compel the needed testi-
mony, despite possible interference with executive functions. The author would argue,
though, that the needs of a civil plaintiff seeking live testimony are not comparable to those
of a defendant in a criminal case. Thus, civil litigation does not warrant judicial interven-
tion. See Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980); Note, Witness for the De-
fense: A Right to Immunity, 34 VAND. L. Rzv. 1665 (1981).
177. For a discussion of the use of immunized grand jury testimony as substantive
evidence under Rule 804(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, see United States v. The-
vis, 84 F.R.D. 57 (N.D. Ga. 1979). In Thevis the government offered immunized grand jury
testimony of a dead declarant for use as substantive evidence in a criminal trial. The court
ruled that the testimony exhibited the requisite circumstantial guarantees of trustworthi-
ness because untruthful testimony would have subjected the immunized declarant to per-
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plaintiff is a governmental entity, plaintiff's concession of deriva-
tive use may be sufficient to override the witness' privilege and al-
low the immunized material to be used as an impeachment/re-
freshment tool. Courts, however, must not assume that the judicial
power to extend access to immunized materials is equivalent to the
power to extend immunity itself.
V. CONCLUSION
Commenting upon the effect that a witness' invocation of the
privilege against self-incrimination has upon the civil discovery
process, one judge declared:
I find this whole defense tactic of trying to hide in a civil case behind a non-
existent threat of criminal prosecution, to be one of the most nauseous devel-
opments in antitrust and in complex litigation cases .... And, I don't find
any derogation of the Fifth Amendment in saying that the Fifth Amendment
wasn't devised to permit people to hide information in civil lawsuits . 7
Certainly, his sentiments are understandable; yet, a court that is
inconvenienced by a witness who previously has received statutory
use immunity and now refuses to repeat his immunized remarks
during civil deposition, should blame use immunity itself rather
than the witness. By his recalcitrance the witness does not hide
jury charges. See supra note 29; see also Strachan, supra note 35, at 824 (immunized testi-
mony generally very reliable). The court next addressed the sixth amendment question and
concluded that the right to confrontation would preclude introduction of the evidence un-
less defendants had waived their confrontation right. Because evidence existed that impli-
cated defendants in the murder of the unavailable declarant, however, the court ruled that
waiver actually had occurred and thus allowed the testimony as substantive evidence. While
the sixth amendment right of confrontation does not arise in the civil context, the rules of
evidence do preserve a party's right to cross-examine witnesses against him in most circum-
stances. When a civil defendant has pleaded nolo contendere to a criminal indictment, a
court might infer that the defendant has waived the right to cross-examine the testimony
offered during a grand jury investigation. Nevertheless, one can make a viable argument
against the trustworthiness of immunized grand jury testimony in the civil context under
certain circumstances. As previously noted, the prosecutor who questions the immunized
witness before the grand jury has two purposes in mind. First, the prosecutor wants to elicit
certain information against the targeted defendant, and second, the prosecutor wants to
limit the witness' responses to avoid jeopardizing any future prosecution of the witness. See
supra text accompanying notes 35-36. Thus, the prosecutor often asks leading questions and
cuts off responses that go beyond the intended scope of the interrogation. These methods
may lead to biased testimony, not because the witness has a motive to lie, although perjury
is not unknown, but because the prosecutor has only a limited interest in presenting to the
grand jury the witness' statements in their entirety. The missing interstitial details are ex-
actly what cross-examination would elicit. In its absence, the trustworthiness of immunized
grand jury testimony may not be sufficient to overcome the civil defendant's objections.
178. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 164,287, at
74,300 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (Judge Singleton, quoting Judge Will's comments about the Folding
Carton antitrust litigation).
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behind a nonexistent privilege; rather, he seeks to preserve the
limited protection afforded him by the federal statute under which
the government originally compelled his immunized statements.
No reason exists to expect the witness, still subject to possible fu-
ture prosecution, to provide evidence voluntarily for the use of a
civil litigant without benefit of a second governmentally conferred
grant of immunity or its equivalent. The current judicial trend of
promoting civil discovery through disclosure and compulsion signi-
fies primarily a tacit judicial preference for the protections af-
forded the witness by transactional rather than use immunity. But
judicial preference alone should not operate to transform one type
of immunity into another.
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